

Linear Pricing and RNV

No Arbitrage Pricing

References: Neftci Ch 11 (but this is a simplified treatment)

Valerio Potì

November 2008

Preliminary notions

- Security: random payoff d with price P
- The payoff, e.g. stock dividend, is revealed and obtained at the end of the period

Arbitrage

- Type A arbitrage: when an investment produces an immediate positive reward with no future payoff
 - e.g. like investing in a security with negative price and zero payoff
- Type B arbitrage: when an investment has non-positive cost but has a positive probability of a positive payoff and no probability of a negative payoff
 - e.g. when you pay nothing (or a negative amount) and you have the chance of getting something

Linear Pricing

- Assumption: the most basic form of arbitrage (Type A) is not possible
- Linear pricing (law of one price) follows
- Linear pricing says that for every real numbers a and b

$$P(ad_1 + bd_2) = P(ad_1) + P(bd_2)$$

Example:

- Consider security d with price P .
Suppose that security $2d$ costs $P' < 2P$
- Is the no Type A arbitrage assumption satisfied?
- You could buy security $2d$ at $P' < 2P$, break it up in two d securities and sell them on for P each
 1. Total cost is $P' < 2P$
 2. Total revenue is $2P$
 3. Arbitrage profit is $2P - P' > 0$

No Arbitrage

If neither Type A nor Type B arbitrage is possible, we say that there is **no arbitrage** possibility

Relative Pricing Preliminaries (Finite State Models)

- Suppose that the outcome of an investment can be described using S (finite) possible **states** of the world
- A **security** is a set of payoffs, one payoff each possible state
 - hence securities are vectors $d = \langle d^1, d^2 \dots d^S \rangle$
- An **elementary security** has a **unit** payoff in one state only, e.g. for state s
 - $d_s = \langle 0, 0, \dots, 1, 0, \dots, 0 \rangle$
- If the elementary state s securities exists, its price is denoted as ψ_s

Relative Pricing (Elementary State Pricing)

- If the elementary securities exist, pricing any other securities is trivial,i.e. by linear pricing:

$$P = \sum_{s=1}^S d^s \psi_s$$

- If elementary state price securities do not exist it might be possible to construct them artificially from traded securities prices, as long as the market is **complete**
- In a complete market there are at least as many independent security prices as there are states

Example

- Only securities x and y are traded:
 - $x = \langle 2, 1 \rangle$ $y = \langle 1, -1 \rangle$
- Elementary security $\langle 1, 0 \rangle$
replication
$$\begin{aligned} s = 1 & \quad n_x 2 + n_y 1 = 1 \\ s = 2 & \quad n_x 1 + n_y (-1) = 0 \end{aligned}$$
- From 2nd equation:
$$n_x = n_y$$
- So, substituting into 1st equation
$$3n_y = 1$$
or
$$n_y = 1/3 \quad \text{and} \quad n_x = 1/3$$

Now, if we know the price of x and y , we can derive the price of the elementary security as a linear combination

When we have the price of the 2 elementary securities corresponding to the 2 states of the world, we can price any security with payoffs in only those two states

Positive State Prices

- The elementary security prices should be positive or you could bundle together a security with negative price (Type B arbitrage)
- **Positive State Prices Theorem:**
A set of positive security prices exists *iff* there is no arbitrage opportunity

Risk Neutral Pricing

- Suppose there are S positive state prices, then the price of any security with payoffs in the S states is:

$$P = \sum_{s=1}^S d^s \psi_s$$

- Let's normalize the state prices s.t. they sum to 1:

$$P = \psi_0 \sum_{s=1}^S \frac{\psi_s}{\psi_0} d^s = \psi_0 \sum_{s=1}^S q_s d^s$$

Where

$$\psi_0 = \sum_{s=1}^S \psi_s \quad q_s = \frac{\psi_s}{\psi_0}$$

Risk Neutral Probabilities

- The normalized state prices q_s can be seen as artificial probabilities (as they sum to 1)
- Then the pricing formula can be rewritten using an expectation defined over these artificial probabilities

$$P = \psi_0 \sum_{s=1}^S q_s d^s = \psi_0 \hat{E}(d)$$

Risk Neutral Probabilities

- By construction, ψ_0 is the price of the security that pays 1 in every state, i.e. the risk free security
- Thus

$$\psi_0 = \frac{1}{1+r}$$

- And the pricing formula becomes:

$$P = \frac{1}{1+r} \hat{E}(d) \quad q_s = \frac{\psi_s}{\psi_0} = (1+r)\psi_s$$

- This is a **risk neutral** pricing formula, under the artificial **risk neutral** probabilities q_s

Little Exercise

Consider the following alternative propositions:

Proposition I: You give me Eur 1. I flip a coin. If it is heads, you are paid Eur 2, if it is tails you are paid Eur 0. You might do so repeatedly. Each time, you might also give me multiples of Eur 1 and the payoffs scale accordingly.

Proposition II: You might keep your money

Proposition III: I flip a coin 3 times. If it is heads twice you are paid Eur 8, otherwise you are paid Eur 0.

Proposition IV: I flip a coin 2 times. You are paid Eur 2 unless it is heads twice. In this case you are paid Eur 6.

Questions:

- i. How much would you pay, at most, to take the bet defined by Proposition (III)?
- ii. How much would you pay, at most, to take the bet defined by Proposition (IV)?

Little Exercise Solution

- i. The price of state 'head' is 0.5 (i.e. price/payoff, $\frac{1}{2}$). The risk-free return (Proposition II) is 1. Thus, the risk-neutral probability of head is 0.5.

You can get 8 with following sequences:

H, H, H	prob: $0.5^3 = 0.125$
T, H, H	prob.: $0.5 \times 0.5^2 = 0.125$
H, T, H	prob.: $0.5^2 \times 0.5 = 0.125$
H, H, T	prob.: $0.5^2 \times 0.5 = 0.125$

The risk-neutral valuation of pay-offs from (III) is therefore

$$0.125 \times 4 \times 8 = 4$$

- ii. Proposition (IV) can be seen as a derivative of the first 2 propositions. The risk neutral probability of head is 0.5.

Thus,

- a. The risk neutral probability of 'it is head twice' is 0.25 and therefore the risk neutral valuation of the Eur 6 payoff is Eur $\frac{6}{4}$ (= Eur 6×0.25);
- b. The risk neutral probability of 'it is not head twice' is 0.75 and therefore the risk neutral valuation of the 2 Eur payoff is Eur $\frac{6}{4}$ (= Eur 2×0.75) too.

Hence, the proposition is worth Eur $\frac{12}{4}$ (= $\frac{6}{4} + \frac{6}{4}$), or Eur 3.

Little Exercise Again

A 'bookie' is quoting the following odds:

Bet 1: Juventus wins UEFA Cup	2 to 1
Bet 2: Milan wins Campionato	2 to 1
Bet 3: Lecce stays in A	2 to 1

If you were the 'bookie' how would you set the odds for the following bets, if your aim was to break even?

Bet 4: any two events considered by Bets 1, 2 and 3 occur

Bet 5: the events considered by both Bet 1 or 2 occur

What about the odds if your aim was a 50% return?

**What about the odds quoted by the 'bookie' on the screen next page?
What is the bookie target risk-free return?**

Monte Carlo Simulation and Options RNV

When used to value European stock options, Monte Carlo simulation involves the following steps:

1. Simulate 1 path for the stock price in a risk neutral world
2. Calculate the payoff from the stock option
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 many times to get many sample payoff
4. Calculate mean payoff
5. Discount mean payoff at risk free rate to get an estimate of the value of the option